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INJURY TO COMPETITION/CONSUMERS IN
HIGH TECH CASES
STEPHEN D. HoucKt
INTRODUCTION
This conference examines two related questions: (1) What
competitive injury must be proven to establish a Sherman Act
violation? and (2) How does one prove the requisite injury?
These questions are important-their resolution is not only of
considerable theoretical interest, but may also determine the
outcome of an antitrust prosecution or litigation.
The other conference participants are distinguished
antitrust enforcement officials, economists and private
practitioners.
I approach both questions from a practical
perspective informed by my years in private practice and
government service. In particular, I draw on my experience in
the United States v. Microsoft Corp. antitrust litigation, where I
served as lead trial counsel to the nineteen plaintiff states and
the District of Columbia, to consider both these questions in the
context of a high tech case.

I.
A.

INJURY TO COMPETITION-THE TEST

Relevance

The issue of injury to competition arises most typically in
rule of reason cases under section 1 of the Sherman Act.'
Indeed, in such cases, it is central to the court's analysis since, as
the Supreme Court has stated, the "criterion to be used in
judging the validity of a restraint on trade is its impact on
competition."2 A plaintiff suing for damages has the burden of
showing an "actual adverse effect on competition as a whole in
t Partner, Reboul, MacMurray, Hewitt, Maynard & Kristol in New York City.
1 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
2 Natl Collegiate Athletic Ass'n. v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984).
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the relevant market."3 The ultimate determination as to the
"reasonableness" of a restraint turns on the weighing of
anticompetitive
harm against its legitimate business
4
justifications.
The significance of an inquiry into injury to competition is
less clear in section 1 per se cases. Per se restraints, like price
fixing, are considered so inimical to competition that their
adverse effects are presumed as a matter of law.5 Accordingly,
no balancing of competitive effects is required. 6 As a leading
treatise notes, such arrangements "are condemned per se
7
without proof of harm to competition."
Similarly, most section 2 cases do not turn on injury to
competition.8 The anticompetitive consequences of monopolythe antithesis of competition-are generally self-evident. 9 There
are two elements of the offense of monopolization: (1) the
possession of monopoly power; and (2) its willful acquisition or
maintenance by means other than superior products, business
acumen, or historic accident. 10 Neither necessitates a rule of
reason inquiry. 1 To be sure, some nexus must be demonstrated
between the alleged exclusionary acts and the acquisition or
maintenance of monopoly power.
Once monopolization is
established, however, no additional showing of consumer injury
is required. Thus, courts in section 2 cases sometimes do assess
3

Capital Imaging v. Mohawk Valley Medical Assoc., 996 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir.

1993).
4 See, e.g., SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 963 (10th Cir. 1994).
5 See Nat'l CollegiateAthletic, 468 U.S. at 100.

6 See, e.g., Bus. Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988)
(stating that "certain categories of agreements . . . have been held to be per se
illegal, dispensing with the need for case-by-case evaluations"); Broad. Music, Inc. v.
CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 17-20 (1979) (finding that blanket licensing was not subject to per
se invalidation).
7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ROGER D. BLAIR & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, II ANTITRUST

LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION

(2000).
8 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
9 See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,

337c

I ANTITRUST LAW: AN

ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION

631 (1996). ("[We

worry about monopoly because of its generally evil result or potentialities: reduced
output and higher prices, diminished incentives for innovation, and fewer
alternatives for suppliers and customers.").
10 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
11 See MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1139 (7th Cir.
.1983).
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a restraint's impact on competition-particularly where it does
not fall into one of the traditional per se categories and its effects
are uncertain. 12
Injury to competition should not be confused with antitrust
injury. While the proofs may overlap, antitrust injury is a
standing concept rather than an element of the offense. The
extent to which antitrust injury must be established, if at all,
depends on the nature of the lawsuit-whether for damages or
equitable relief and whether brought by a private litigant or the
United States government. A private litigant (including the
states) is entitled to sue for injunctive relief "against threatened
loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws."1 3 This
standard is "notably different" from that of proof of actual injury
to "business or property" required to recover damages. 14 The
standard also differs from the statutory provision, which has no
"loss or damage" requirement, that authorizes the United States
to seek equitable relief to prevent or restrain violations of the
Sherman Act.' 5 These distinctions are summarized well by
Professors Areeda, Blair, and Hovenkamp:
[W]here the defendant's conduct is illegal without proof of
market effects, the government prevails merely by proving the
conduct. The private plaintiff must show in addition that the
violation caused it actual injury of the kind that the antitrust
or-in the case of equity relieflaws were designed to prevent
6
the threat of such injury.'
B.

Proofof Actual Consumer Harm Not Required

Notwithstanding its significance, there is no comprehensive
discussion in the case law of what is necessary to establish
injury to competition or, as it is sometimes called, injury "to the

12 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("[To
be condemned as exclusionary, a monopolist's act must have an 'anticompetitive
effect.' "), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 350 (2001); see also Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224-29 (1993) (dealing with predatory
pricing); Aspen Skiing Co., v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605
(1985) (discussing exclusionary conduct).
13 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2000).
14 Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 260 (1972); see also Cargill, Inc. v.
Montfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 111 (1986).
15 15 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
16 AREEDA, BLAIR & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, [ 330c.
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competitive process."' 7 A typical formulation, stated by the
Supreme Court in National Society of ProfessionalEngineers v.
United StatesI8 is that a court may conclude that contracts or
other conduct unreasonably restrain trade based "either (1) on
the nature or character of the contracts, or (2) on surrounding
circumstances giving rise to the inference or presumption that
they were intended to restrain trade and enhance prices." 19
The ultimate beneficiary of the antitrust laws is, of course,
the consumer. 20 There appears to be no requirement of proof of
actual harm to consumers, however, beyond that of injury to
competition. The Supreme Court went on to state in National
Society of ProfessionalEngineers that "[u]nder either branch of
the test, the inquiry is confined to a consideration of impact on
competitive conditions." 21 To be sure, courts sometimes do
discuss actual consumer harm but only as one means of proving
injury to competition, not as a separate requirement necessary to
22
establish a violation.
Proof of actual consumer harm is not required because it is
inferred from injury to competition. That competition benefits
consumers is a central tenet of modern economic theory and a
bedrock principle of the Sherman Act. As Professor Franklin M.
Fisher, a government economic expert, testified at the Microsoft
trial: "The economics of antitrust policy is based upon the
proposition that competition ends up, in one way or another,
always being good for consumers. That proposition is the central
proposition of microeconomics, and, therefore, in my view, the
17

Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 135 (1998).

18

435 U.S. 679 (1978).

19 Id. at 690.
20 See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (stating that
"Congress designed the Sherman Act as a 'consumer welfare prescription' ").
21 Nat'l Soc'y ofProfi Engineers,435 U.S. at 690.
22 See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co., v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585,
605 (1985) (Tit is relevant to consider [alleged exclusionary conduct's] impact on
consumers and whether it has impaired competition in an unnecessarily restrictive
way."); FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61 (1985)
Since the purpose of the inquiries into market definition and market power
is to determine whether an arrangement has the potential for genuine
adverse effects on competition, 'proof of actual detrimental effects, such as
a reduction of output,' can obviate the need for an inquiry into market
power, which is but a 'surrogate for detrimental effects.
Id. (quoting PHILLIP E. AREEDA, VII ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 1511 (1986)).
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central proposition of all economics." 23 Or, as the Supreme Court
stated in NorthernPacificRailway Co. v. United States:
[The Sherman Act] rests on the premise that the unrestrained
interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of
our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality
and the greatest material progress, while at the same time
providing an environment conducive to the24preservation of our
democratic political and social institutions.
There are also important policy reasons why a court's hand
should not be stayed until measurable consumer harm has been
inflicted. The time lag between a violation upstream in the
competitive process, the consequent diminution in competition,
and its ultimate impact on consumers may be significant. The
delay between violation and remediation is likely to be
exacerbated by the considerable time often needed for discovery
and trial in antitrust cases. Requiring proof of actual consumer
injury would risk infliction of severe harm before remedial
measures could be implemented and is inconsistent with the
statutory provisions authorizing both private and government
actions to restrain threatened violations of the antitrust laws.2
Such a requirement would also encourage prospective
violators by lengthening the time in which they could reap the
benefits of their unlawful conduct. This is especially risky in
many high tech markets where, for the reasons described below,
network effects enhance the incentives to engage in
In those markets, a dominant
anticompetitive conduct. 26
position achieved or maintained by anticompetitive means can
become so entrenched that effective remediation may be
impossible-thus making it likely that the predator will retain at
least some of the fruits of its predation. Timely relief is of
27
particular importance in these markets.
23 Microsoft Trial Transcript at 20, In. 14-19 (No. 98-1232; 98-1233) (June 2,
1999, A.M. Session), United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C.
2000), vacated, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 350 (2001).
24 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958); see also Natl Soc'y ofProfl Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 695 ("The
assumption that competition is the best method of allocating resources in a free
market recognizes that all elements of a bargain-quality, service, safety, and
durability-and not just the immediate cost, are favorably affected by the free
opportunity to select among alternative offers.").
25 See supra notes 13, 15 and accompanying text.
26 See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES 173-186 (1999).
27 See Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Antitrust Enforcement in Dynamic Network

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol.75:593

C. Anticompetitive Effects: Price, Output, Consumer Choice, and
Innovation
When courts discuss "injury to competition," they most
commonly have in mind effects on price or output. 28 These
effects have been referred to as "the paradigmatic examples of
restraints of trade that the Sherman Act was intended to
prohibit." 29 They are closely related, for power over output
30
implies power over price.
Any assessment of a restraint's anticompetitive impact,
however, will be incomplete if limited to price and output effects.
The restraint's impact on consumer choice and innovation must
also be considered. As explained below, these effects may be
particularly important in understanding the anticompetitive
injury inflicted by predatory conduct in high tech markets.
Consumer choice and innovation are undoubtedly core values
protected by the antitrust laws.
Our free market economy is predicated on the assumption
that resources are best allocated when consumers express their
preferences by selecting among competing alternatives.3 ' FTC
Commissioner Thomas B. Leary has described as one of the two
"great" principles of the last antitrust millennium that
consumers "should generally be free to make their own choices
about the goods and services that they want to buy."32 The

Industries, ANTITRUST BULLETIN, Sept. 22, 1998, available at 1998 WL 16568457
(stating that "early intervention that encourages competition on the merits [in
dynamic network industries] is to be preferred to late intervention after the
standard has been determined").
28 See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979) (stating that "in
characterizing

. . . conduct under the per se rule, our inquiry must focus

on ... whether the practice facially appears to be one that would always or almost
always tend to restrict competition and decrease output").
29 Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 107-08 (1984).
30 See Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 895 F.2d 352, 359 (7th Cir. 1990).
31 As Professor Fisher succinctly put it at the Microsoft trial, "Giving choice is
what competition is about." Microsoft Trial Transcript at 28, In. 2-3 (No. 98-1232;
98-1233) (June 7, 1999, A.M. Session), United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp.
2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000), vacated, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct.
350 (2001).
32 Thomas B. Leary, Freedom as the Core Value of Antitrust in the New
Millennium, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 545, 545 (2000); see also FTC v. Id. Fed'n of
Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 462 (1986) ("[Defendant] is not entitled to pre-empt the
working of the market by deciding for itself that its customers do not need that
which they demand.").
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critical importance of consumer choice in the antitrust
framework was underscored by the Supreme Court in National
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, which stated that
"[a] restraint that has the effect of reducing the importance of
consumer preference in setting price and output is not consistent
with this fundamental goal of antitrust law."33 The less choice
consumers have in a market, the greater the control suppliers
are likely to have over price and output. Indeed, freedom of
choice would be a meaningless right if consumers had no
alternatives from which to choose. A key goal of antitrust
enforcement, therefore, is assuring that anticompetitive conduct
does not deprive consumers of a meaningful set of options from
34
which to select goods and services that best meet their needs.
An equally important goal of antitrust enforcement is
protecting suppliers' freedom to innovate from constraints
Innovation is
imposed by rivals' anticompetitive conduct.
important because it enhances consumer welfare. For one thing,
innovation leads directly to improvements in "quality," a
recognized benefit of the competitive process. 35 Perhaps more
importantly, innovation determines the future range of options
available-i.e. the choices they will have and the prices they will
pay.36 A leading treatise observes that "[i]n the long run,
technological progress contributes far more to consumer welfare
than does the elimination of non-competitive prices. The pace of

33 Nat' Collegiate Athletic, 468 U.S. at 107; see also ROBERT H. BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 91

(1993) ("The role of the

antitrust laws, then, lies at that stage of the economic process in which production
and distribution of goods and services are organized in accordance with the scale of
values that consumers choose by their relative willingness to purchase.").
34 See Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified
Theory of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 713, 713
(1996) ("The antitrust laws are intended to ensure that the marketplace remains
competitive, so that a meaningful range of options is made available to consumers
... ."); see also BORK, supra note 33, at 91 ('The [antitrust] law's mission is to
preserve, improve, and reinforce the powerful economic mechanisms that compel
businesses to respond to consumers.").
35 See, e.g., United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993)
(stating that "deterioration in quality" is anticompetitive effect for purposes of rule
of reason analysis); Interface Group v. Mass. Port Auth., 816 F.2d 9, 10 (1st Cir.
1987) (stating that the "the competitive process ...aims to bring consumers the
benefits of lower prices, better products, and more efficient production methods").
36 See Rubinfeld, supra note 27 ("It is the force of innovation that can lead to
higher quality products being offered at lower prices to consumers in the future.").
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technological progress is largely determined by innovative
activity. Competition is a spur to cost reduction, to product
37
improvement, and to the development of new products."
Antitrust enforcement agencies now commonly consider a
restraint's effect on innovation when assessing its impact.38 In
short, there can be no doubt, as Professor Hovenkamp has
written, that "antitrust injury can refer to loss of technical
progressiveness, or innovation, just as much as loss of
39
competitive pricing."
D. Importance of Consumer Choice and Innovation in High
Tech Markets
The anticompetitive effects most commonly considered by
the courts-higher prices and reduced output-are not always
the most accurate indicators of injury to competition. For
example, monopoly maintenance cases concern conduct allegedly
undertaken to preserve, not create, the power to charge high
prices and to restrict output. In such cases, although the
monopolist may have achieved its anticompetitive goal, there
40
may be no measurable change in price or output.
Similarly, anticompetitive tactics employed to take
advantage of the network effects that create significant entry
barriers in many high tech markets may not immediately affect
price and output. In such markets, "there is an increased
likelihood that a single firm may come to dominate ... and ]
persist in that dominance." 41 The "winner-take-all" aspect of
these markets creates huge incentives to immediately

37 See PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOvENKAMP & JOHN L. SOLOW, ILA
ANTITUST LAW I 407a (1995).
38 See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION & U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS § 3.32(c) (April
2000) ("In many cases, an agreement's competitive effects on innovation are
analyzed as a separate competitive effect in a relevant goods market."); see also In

re Glaxo plc, No. C-3586, 1995 WL 382176 (F.T.C. June 14, 1995) (discussing the
FTC consent order in a merger challenged on grounds of impact on "innovation

markets").
39

HERBERT HOvENKAMP, XIII ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST

PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION [ 2234b (1999).

40 See Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 153 (1951) (finding
exclusionary conduct unlawful without showing of price or output effects).
41 See Rubinfeld, supra note 27.
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capture as much market shares as possible. 42
With the rewards of success so enormous and the
consequences of failure so stark, the temptation to engage in
The imperative to
anticompetitive conduct may be great.
achieve early dominance is even greater in these markets
because perception often influences reality-customers wish to
acquire the product they perceive as likely to become the
Among the arsenal of potentially
industry standard. 43
exclusionary tactics that may be employed to achieve or
maintain market power are below cost "penetration pricing,"
tying, announcement of "vaporware," and strengthening of entry
barriers to prevent encroachment of competing technologies from
adjacent markets.44
The anticompetitive effects of these practices will not be
fully reflected by short-term changes in price and output.
Indeed, initial changes in price and output may be misleading.
Thus, prices may be artificially depressed to build volume in
anticipation of recoupment once dominance is achieved.
Similarly, in the drive to oust competition, production may be
increased to flood the market, particularly where marginal cost
approaches zero (as it often does with intellectual property). In
any event, output effects are difficult to gauge. 45 That difficulty
is likely to be compounded when the market as a whole is new
and expanding, as it often is with high tech products. 46 Market
42 See Paul Krugman, Create and Destroy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2000, at WK15
("[Tlnvestors have learned very well the lesson of Microsoft and Intel: that
technology markets tend to be winner-takes-all, and a company that gets an early
advantage in a new technology may well be able to translate that advantage into a
sustained, lucrative monopoly."); see also SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 26, at 177
(stating that the dynamics of a "winner-take-all" market are "driven by the strong
desire of users to select the technology that will ultimately prevail-that is, to
choose the network that has (or will have) the most users").
43 See SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 26, at 176 ("If your product is seen as
failing, those very perceptions can spell doom.").
44 See generally Rubinfeld, supranote 27.
45 See Franklin M. Fisher, Antitrust and Innovative Industries, 68 ANTITRUST
L.J. 559, 562 (2000) ("[Output reduction is but a deceptively simple way to think
about anticompetitive effects. Where products differ as to quality, output hasboth a
quantity and a quality dimension, and defining 'output reduction,' at best, requires
a sophisticated and often difficult combination of both.").
46 One company's increased sales in an expanding market may be meaningless
measured against a rival's significant gain in market share. For example,
Microsoft's rapid acquisition of Web browser market share above 50% was found to
have created a dangerous probability of monopolization even though the absolute
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power is used as a "surrogate for detrimental effects" precisely
because of the difficulty in isolating and measuring price and
output effects.47 As Professor Areeda observes:
"[O]utput" is not always a clear concept. Even when we define
it readily, it is usually difficult to observe. Many alleged
restraints are experienced before they have had time to work
their results. And the longer a restraint has been in effect, the
greater is the impact of changes in supply, demand, and other
market forces. We are often unable to disentangle the effects of
challenged conduct. That is the reason we are so often forced to
for actual effects. The usual surrogate is
turn to surrogates
48
market power.
By contrast, the impact of anticompetitive practices on
consumer choice is likely to be more consequential and
immediate. 49 A company's objective in engaging in exclusionary
conduct is, after all, to induce consumers to select its productsnot merely by improving its own products, but by impeding its
Market power may be used
rivals' ability to compete.50
anticompetitively to increase rivals' costs, to create or maintain
barriers to entry, to make it more difficult for rivals to distribute
their products or otherwise to influence consumers' purchasing
decisions on some basis besides price or quality.51
Likewise, a restraint's adverse impact on innovation is of
particular concern in high tech markets. Promising avenues of
development may be prematurely foreclosed simply because they
threaten the market leader's continued dominance. 52 Skewing
number of Netscape's Web browsers in use had increased. See United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 46 (D.D.C. 2000), aff'd in part & rev'd in part,
253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 350 (2001).
47 United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting FTC v.
End. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986)).
48 AREEDA, supra note 22, at %[
1503b.
49 See Averitt & Lande, supra note 34, at 715 ("In certain sectors of the
economy-for example, high tech or media-related industries-diversity of options
may be far more important to consumers than price competition.").
50 See, e.g., Full Draw Prod. v. Easton Sports, Inc., 182 F.3d 745, 755 (10th Cir.
1999) ("The effect of defendants' alleged boycott was... to distort and ultimately
reduce competition by destroying one source of output ... and thereby limiting
consumer choice to the other source of output .... ").
51 See, e.g., Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 895 F.2d 352, 360 (stating that the boycott's
anticompetitive effects included the fact that "it raises costs to interfere with the
consumer's free choice to take the product of his liking" and "impose[s] higher costs"
on defendants' rivals).
52 See John J. Flynn, Antitrust Policy, Innovation Efficiencies, and the
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the path of innovation may have a profound impact on the
variety, quality, and price of products ultimately available to
consumers. Moreover, once a product becomes entrenched as the
standard in a market with network externalities, it can be
difficult to oust even though a more innovative, superior
53
alternative becomes available.
E.

Injury to Competition-The Proof
Injury to competition can be difficult to establish where it is
not presumed as a matter of law from the violation itself. Even
effects on price or output-arguably more quantifiable than
effects on consumer choice or innovation-can be difficult to
prove. Moreover, as seen, price and output effects may be poor
indicators of anticompetitive injury in high tech industries. The
difficulties of proof are compounded where the violations are
ongoing and the anticompetitive injury, while quite real, is
largely prospective.
The record in the Microsoft case contains extensive evidence
of the injury Microsoft Corporation ("Microsoft") inflicted on the
competitive process by a variety of exclusionary practices
intended to thwart or eliminate its few actual or would-be
competitors in the markets for PC operating systems and Web
browsers. Its defenders argue, however, that Microsoft inflicted
no real harm because consumers were not injured.54 Their
argument ignores not only the fundamental principle of economic
theory and antitrust law, namely that consumers suffer when
Suppression of Technology, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 487, 504-505 (1998) ("History has
shown that a pattern of technology suppression is particularly likely to occur in an
industry characterized by long-term market concentration. Once a dominant
position has been gained, the dominant firm maintains its power by practices
designed to regulate competing technologies and sustain the incumbent's
monopoly.").
53 See SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 26, at 103-04, 184-85 (discussing impact

of lock-in and switching costs).
54 See David S. Evans and Richard L. Schmalensee, Be Nice to Your Rivals:
How the Government Is Selling an Antitrust Case Without Consumer Harm in

United States v. Microsoft, DID MICROSOFT HARM CONSUMERS? Two OPPOSING
VIEWS 45, 72 (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies et. al. eds., 2000)
("While Microsoft did compete to defend its market position, none of the actions to
which the government objects has harmed consumers or is likely to do so."). This
volume contains an informative exchange of views on the economic aspects of the
case between economists on the Mficrosoft side (Dr. Evans and Dean Schmalensee)
and those on the government side (Professors Rubinfeld and Fisher).
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competition is impaired, but the real evidence-and the court's
findings-of actual consumer harm.
To be sure, the government's principal objective at trial was
to establish that Microsoft possessed monopoly power and
maintained it by improper means. This focus was dictated by
the need to prove the essential elements of the offenses allegedprincipally monopoly maintenance, attempted monopolization,
and per se violations like tying-in a complex case where each
side was limited to twelve witnesses on its case in chief.55Nevertheless, as the record demonstrated, consumers were
injured by Microsoft's practices.
My closing argument
summarized that evidence-not because it was necessary to
establish Microsoft's liability-but so that the court would
appreciate the full impact of Microsoft's anticompetitive conduct
when considering what remedies to impose. Moreover, the
adverse effects of Microsoft's conduct on consumers was the
principal reason my clients-nineteen states and the District of
Columbia-were plaintiffs.
Set forth below is a summary of the evidence supporting my
argument that Microsoft's conduct hurt consumers in three
significant respects: (1) by restricting their choices, (2) by
denying them the benefits of price competition, and (3) by
impeding the development of new products. 56 It is followed by
relevant excerpts from Judge Jackson's findings of fact. 57 This
evidence and the court's findings provide guidance on how to
prove consumer injury. Such proof, even if not essential to
establish an element of the cause of action, may be useful in
demonstrating both injury to competition and the need for
significant relief.

55 Additional considerations were that injury to competition wa presumed as a
matter of law from the nature of the offenses alleged and that the U.S. government
did not have to establish an antitrust injury to obtain equitable relief.
56 My closing argument appears in Microsoft, Nos. 98-1232; 98-1233, 1999 WL
744052 (D.D.C. Sept. 21, 1999).
57 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999), affd in
part & rev'd in part,253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 350 (2001).
The findings of fact were subjected to a clearly erroneous standard of review. See
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 117 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122
S. Ct. 350 (2001). None of the findings of fact cited infra were overturned. Id.
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II.

CONSUMER CHOICE

A. Summary of Evidence
Through its exclusionary conduct, Microsoft intentionally
deprived consumers of choice in a variety of ways. By thwarting
products that threatened to erode the applications barrier to
entry protecting its monopoly operating system, Microsoft
achieved its ultimate objective: consumers had no choice but to
use Windows to run their desired applications, despite the
availability of comparable or superior operating systems. 58
Moreover, to deter the emergence of competition, Microsoft
imposed uniformity on personal computer makers (OEMs) that
prevented them from differentiating their products to give
consumers more options and other benefits.5 9 Finally, fearing
that consumers would prefer Netscape's Web browser,
Navigator, to its own, Internet Explorer, if both were equally
available, Microsoft used its monopoly power to obtain restrictive
contracts with OEMs, Internet service providers (ISPs), and
60
others, making it more difficult for them to obtain Navigator.
58 Most of the evidence in the case dealt with Microsoft's exclusionary conduct
that was intended to preserve the applications barrier to entry that protected its
Windows monopoly. As to Microsof's obvious success, see the e-mail from HewlettPackard to Microsoft stating that "if we had a choice of another supplier, based on
your actions in this area, I assure you would not be our supplier of choice." Microsoft
Trial Transcript at 14-15 (No. 98-1232; 98-1233) (Sept. 21, 1999, A.M. Session),
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000), vacated by, 253
F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert.denied, 122 S.Ct. 350 (2001). In addition, also very
telling is the testimony of IBM executive Garry Norris describing the blunt
statement of Microsoft's Mark Baber to IBM: "Where else are you going to go? This
is the only game in town." Microsoft Trial Transcript at 66-67 (No. 98-1232; 981233) (June 7, 1999, AM. Session), Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d 59.
59 See, e.g., Microsoft Trial Transcript at 47, 1999 WL 97523 (Nos. 98-1232; 981233) (Feb. 25, 1999, K-M. Session), Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 ("Microsoft's
mandated removal of all OEM boot-sequence and auto-start programs... has
resulted in significant and costly problems for the HP-Pavilion line of retail P.C.'s.");
Microsoft Trial Transcript at 17, 1999 WL 744052 (Nos. 98-1232; 98-1233) (Sept. 21,
1999, AM. Session), Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 ("Gateway wants to have
flexibility on anything associated with the Internet. We want Microsoft to provide
us with the technology, not make decisions and choices for us or our customers."). In
addition, the testimony of IBM and Hewlett-Packard executives asserted that
MicrosofVs forced removal of their tutorials from the boot-up sequence made their
PC's harder to use, caused customer confusion and led to increased service calls. See
Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d 59; Microsoft Trial Transcript at 38-43, 1999 WL 370326
(Nos. 98-1232; 98-1233) (June 7, 1999, P.M. Session), Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d 59.
60 See Microsoft Trial Transcript at 62-63, 1999 WL 744052 (Nos. 98-1232; 98-
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Findingsof Fact
That Microsoft's market share and the applications barrier to
entry together endow the company with monopoly power in the
market for Intel-compatible PC operating systems is directly
evidenced by the sustained absence of realistic commercial
61
alternatives to Microsoft's PC operating-system products.
[Viendors of Intel-compatible PC operating systems do not view
their own offerings as viable alternatives to Windows.
Microsoft knows that OEMs have no choice but to load
Windows, both because it has a good understanding of the
market in which it operates and because OEMs have told
62
Microsoft as much ....
If OEMs removed the most visible means of invoking Internet
Explorer, and pre-installed Navigator with facile methods of
access, Microsoft's purpose in forcing OEMs to take Internet
Explorer-capturing browser usage share from Netscapewould be subverted. The same would be true if OEMs simply
configured their machines to promote Navigator before
Windows had a chance to promote Internet Explorer ....
Therefore, in order to bring the behavior of OEMs into line with
its strategic goals quickly, Microsoft threatened to terminate
the Windows license of any OEM that removed Microsoft's
chosen icons and program entries from the Windows desktop or
the "Start" menu. It threatened similar punishment for OEMs
who added programs that promoted third-party software to the
Windows "boot" sequence .... 63
Promoting non-Microsoft software and services was not the
only, or even the primary, purpose of the OEM introductory
programs. The primary purpose, rather, was to make the
experience of setting up and learning to use a new PC system

1233) (Feb. 10, 1999, A.M. Session), Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, (containing
testimony of Microsoft executive Cameron Myhrvold that Microsoft prevented ISPs
from disclosing the availability of Navigator because it believed that the vast

majority of consumers would pick Navigator over Internet Explorer (IE) in a side by
side comparison); Microsoft Trial Transcript at 52, 1999 WL 744052 (Nos. 98-1232;
98-1233) (Sept. 21, 1999, A.M. Session), Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 ("It seems clear

that it will be very hard to increase browser market share on the merits of IE 4
alone. It will be more important to leverage the operating system (OS) asset to make
people use IE instead of Navigator.").
61 Microsoft, 97 Supp. 2d at 44.
62
63

Id. at 45.
Id. at 157-58.
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easier and less confusing for users, especially novices. By doing
so, the OEMs believed, they would increase the value of their
systems and minimize both product returns and costly support
calls .... 64
In addition to tutorials, sign-up programs, and splash screens,
a few large OEMs developed programs that ran automatically
at the conclusion of a new PC system's first boot sequence.
These programs replaced the Windows desktop either with a
user interface designed by the OEM or with Navigator's user
interface. The OEMs that implemented automatically loading
alternative user interfaces did so out of the belief that many
users, particularly novice ones, would find the alternate
interfaces less complicated and confusing than the Windows
65
desktop.
When Gates became aware of what the OEMs were doing, he
expressed concern to Kempin, the Microsoft executive in charge
of OEM sales. On January 6, 1996, Gates wrote to Kempin:
"Winning Internet browser share is a very very important goal
for us. Apparently a lot of OEMs are bundling non-Microsoft
browsers and coming up with offerings together with Internet
Service providers that get displayed on their machines in a
FAR more prominent way than MSN or our Internet browser."
Less than three weeks later, Kempin delivered his semi-annual
report on OEM sales to his superiors. In the report, he
identified "Control over start-up screens, MSN and IE
placement" as one interest that Microsoft had neglected over
66
the previous six months ....
In an effort to thwart the practice of OEM customization,
Microsoft began, in the spring of 1996, to force OEMs to accept
a series of restrictions on their ability to reconfigure the
Windows 95 desktop and boot sequence. There were five such
restrictions, which were manifested either as amendments to
existing Windows 95 licenses or as terms in new Windows 98
licenses .... 67
The several OEMs that in the aggregate represented over
ninety percent of Intel-compatible PC sales believed that the
new restrictions would make their PC systems more difficult

64
65
66
67

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

162.

163.

163-64.
164.
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and more confusing to use, and thus less acceptable to
consumers. They also anticipated that the restrictions would
increase product returns and support costs and generally lower
the value of their machines .... 68
Microsoft was willing to sacrifice some goodwill and some of the
value that OEMs attached to Windows in order to exclude
Netscape from the crucial OEM distribution channel.
Microsoft's restrictions succeeded in raising the costs to OEMs
of pre-installing and promoting Navigator. These increased
costs, in turn, were in some cases significant enough to deter
OEMs from pre-installing Navigator altogether .... 69
The market for Intel-compatible PCs is, by all accounts, a
competitive one. Consequently, any OEM that tries to force an
unwanted, low-quality shell on consumers will do so at its own
peril. Had Microsoft's sole concern been consumer satisfaction,
it would have relied more on the power of the market-and less
on its own market power-to prevent OEMs from making
70
modifications that lead to consumer disappointment.
By refusing to offer those OEMs who requested it a version of
Windows without Web browsing software, and by preventing
OEMs from removing Internet Explorer--or even the most
obvious means of invoking it-prior to shipment, Microsoft
forced OEMs to ignore consumer demand for a browserless
version of Windows ....
By ensuring that Internet Explorer
would launch in certain circumstances in Windows 98 even if
Navigator were set as the default, and even if the consumer had
removed all conspicuous means of invoking Internet Explorer,
Microsoft created confusion and frustration for consumers, and
increased technical support costs for business customers....
By constraining the freedom of OEMs to implement certain
software programs in the Windows boot sequence, Microsoft
foreclosed an opportunity for OEMs to make Windows PC
systems less confusing and more user-friendly, as consumers
desired. By taking the actions listed above, and by enticing
firms into exclusivity arrangements with valuable inducements
that only Microsoft could offer and that the firms reasonably
believed they could not do without, Microsoft forced those
consumers who otherwise would have elected Navigator as
their browser to either pay a substantial price (in the forms of
68
69
70

Id. at 165.
Id. at 168-69.
Id. at 178.
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downloading, installation, confusion, degraded system
performance, and diminished memory capacity) or content
themselves with Internet Explorer. . .. 71
III. PRICE
A. Summary of Evidence
Because it was not seeking damages, the government was
not required to establish the amount by which Microsoft had
overcharged consumers.
Nevertheless, there was abundant
evidence in the record that the source of Microsoft's enormous
profits was-not surprisingly-its ability to exact monopoly
rents for Windows. 72
That Microsoft could set prices unfettered by normal
competitive constraints is evident from key memoranda
reflecting Microsoft's deliberations on the pricing of Windows 98,
which are devoid of any reference to competitors' prices. 73
Indeed, Joachim Kempin, the Microsoft executive responsible for
Windows sales to OEMs, conceded that in setting the price of
Windows 98, the only price of interest to him was the price of
Windows 95.74 The full extent of Microsoft's power over prices
was apparent from its ability to increase the price of Windows
95-an obsolete product-in support of the Windows 98 product
launch. 75
Dr. Frederick R. Warren-Boulton, a government economic
7'

Id. at 327-29.

Dr. Frederick R. Warren-Boulton, one of the government's expert economists,
testified that Microsoft's profits were an "astonishing" thirty eight and one-half
percent of revenue, by far the highest of any Fortune 500 company. Microsoft Trial
Transcript at 11, 1998 WL 812320 (Nos. 98-1232; 98-1233) (Nov. 23, 1998, A.M.
Session), Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d 59.
73 With respect to the Government Exhibit 1371 (the "Windows Launch
Review"), Dr. Warren-Boulton testified that Microsoft's ability to charge $89 for the
Windows 98 upgrade-substantially more than the presumably profitable $49 it
also considered-was clear evidence of its monopoly power. See Microsoft Trial
Transcript at 24-25, 1998 WL 831135 (Nos. 98-1232; 98-1233) (Dec. 1, 1998, P.M.
Session), Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d 59.
74 Microsoft Trial Transcript at 97-99 (Nos. 98-1232; 98-1233) (Feb. 25, 1999
P.M. Session), Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d 59.
75 As Professor Fisher pointed out, an obsolete product normally declines in
value when a newer version is introduced. See Microsoft Trial Transcript at 45-46,
1999 WL 10209 (Nos. 98-1232; 98-1233) (Jan. 12, 1999, P.M. Session), Microsoft
Corp, 97 F. Supp. 2d 59.
72
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expert, estimated that Windows prices were "significantly" more
Mr. Kempin himself
than 5% above competitive levels.7 6
77
described Windows prices as "high." Indeed, e-mail of other top
Microsoft executives (including Bill Gates) demonstrated that
Microsoft's exclusionary conduct was motivated by its desire to
prevent Netscape, Sun, and others from pursuing strategies that
would "commoditize" Windows-i.e., force Microsoft to slash
78
prices for Windows as if it were a commodity.

B. Findingsof Fact
OEMs believe that the likelihood of a viable alternative to
Windows emerging any time in the next few years is too low to
constrain Microsoft from raising prices or imposing other
burdens on customers and users .... Microsoft knows that
OEMs have no choice but to load Windows, both because it has
a good understanding of the market in which it operates and
because OEMs have told Microsoft as much .... Secure in this
knowledge, Microsoft did not consider the prices of other Intelcompatible PC operating systems when it set the price of
79
Windows 98.

Microsoft's actual pricing behavior is consistent with the
proposition that the firm enjoys monopoly power in the market
for Intel-compatible PC operating systems. The company's
decision not to consider the prices of other vendors' Intelcompatible PC operating systems when setting the price of
Windows 98, for example, is probative of monopoly power. One
would expect a firm in a competitive market to pay much closer
attention to the prices charged by other firms in the market.
Another indication of monopoly power is the fact that Microsoft
raised the price that it charged OEMs for Windows 95, with
76 Microsoft Trial Transcript at 26-27, 1998 WL 803824 (Nos. 98-1232; 98-1233)
(Nov. 19, 1998 A.M. Session), Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d 59.
77 Microsoft Trial Transcript at 42-48, 1999 WL 744052 (Nos. 98-1232; 98-1233)
(Sept. 21, 1999, A.M. Session) (citing Govt. Ex. 365), Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d. In
this e-mail, Mr. Kempin also noted that Windows prices had increased while prices

of all other PC system components had decreased sharply. See id.
78 See Microsoft Trial Transcript at 42-43, 1999 WL 10209 (Nos. 98-1232; 981233) (Jan. 11, 1999, A.M. Session), Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (citing Bill Gates'
"Internet Tidal Wave" memorandum, Govt. Ex. 20) ("[Netscape is] pursuing a multiplatform strategy where they move the key API into the client to commoditize the
underlying operating system."); Microsoft Trial Transcript at 42-43, 1999 WL 10209
(Nos. 98-1232; 98-1233) (Jan. 11, 1999, A.M. Session), Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d 59.
79 Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 45-46.
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trivial exceptions, to the same level as the price it charged for
Windows 98 just prior to releasing the newer product. In a
competitive market, one would expect the price of an older
operating system to stay the same or decrease upon the release
of a newer, more attractive version .... 80
Finally, it is indicative of monopoly power that Microsoft felt
that it had substantial discretion in setting the price of its
Windows 98 upgrade product (the operating system product it
sells to existing users of Windows 95). A Microsoft study from
November 1997 reveals that the company could have charged
$49 for an upgrade to Windows 98-there is no reason to
believe that the $49 price would have been unprofitable-but
the study identifies $89 as the revenue-maximizing price.
Microsoft thus opted for the higher price.81
An aspect of Microsoft's pricing behavior that, while not
tending to prove monopoly power, is consistent with the fact
that the firm charges different OEMs different prices for
Windows, depending on the degree to which the individual
82
OEMs comply with Microsofts wishes.
IV. INNOVATION
A.

Summary of Evidence

The government did not seek to controvert the obvious fact
that software companies are innovative.
Indeed, as the
government's own economists testified, even monopolists have
incentives to innovate. The government did contend, however,
that Microsoft used its market power to stifle innovative
products and technologies developed by its rivals that threatened
its Windows monopoly.83
The adverse impact of Microsoft's predatory conduct on
innovation in the market for Web browsers was described by
knowledgeable witnesses, including market participants and

80

Id. at 52.

81 Id. 53.
82

Id.

As Judge Wyzanski observed, even though a monopolist does not opt for the
quiet life, "creativity in business as in other areas, is best nourished by multiple
centers of activity." United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295,
347 (D. Mass. 1953), affd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
83
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Corroborative testimony by additional
outside experts.8 4
witnesses recounted similar predatory conduct directed by
Microsoft with like effect on other innovative technologies, such
as Intel's NSP and Sun's Java.85 The most pernicious impact of
Microsoft's conduct, however, was described as its deterrent
effect on companies contemplating the development of products
likely to be perceived by Microsoft as threatening to its
86
dominance.
B. Findingsof Fact
Microsoft pressured the major OEMs to not install NSP
software on their PCs until the software ceased to expose APIs.
NSP software could not find its way onto PCs without the
cooperation of the OEMs, so Intel realized that it had no choice
but to surrender the pace of software innovation to Microsoft.
By the end of July 1995, Intel had agreed to stop promoting its
NSP software. Microsoft subsequently incorporated some of
NSP's components into its operating-system products. Even as
late as the end of 1998, though, Microsoft still had not
implemented key capabilities that Intel had been poised to offer

84 See, e.g., Microsoft Trial Transcript at 34-35, 47-48, 1998 WL 852605 (Nos.
98-1232; 98-1233) (Dec. 9, 1998, A.M. Session), Microsoft, 97 F.2d 59 (containing the
testimony of government technical expert, Professor David J. Farber, stating that
Microsoft's tying of IE to Windows without technical justification had hurt
consumers by stifling the initiative of other companies to innovate in the browser
space); Microsoft Trial Transcript at 59-60, 1998 WL 735842 (Nos. 98-1232; 981233) (Oct. 21, 1998, P.M. Session), Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (containing the
testimony of Netscape CEO James Barksdale that overall browser innovation had
been delayed by one to two years as a result of Microsoft's predatory conduct).
85 See, e.g., Microsoft Trial Transcript at 46-47 (Nos. 98-1232; 98-1233) (Nov. 9,
1998), Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (containing the testimony of Steven D. McGeady
of Intel stating that, had it not been stifled by Microsoft, Intel's Native Signal
Processing technology "would have allowed a lot more innovation in both software
and hardware that would have.., brought new media capabilities to the PC more
70-74 (Nos. 98-1232;
quickly over time"), Trial Testimony of James A. Gosling at
98-1233) Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (stating that Microsoft's actions "threaten to
fragment the Java technology," thereby undermining "the potential of this
technology to reduce the barriers to developing new operating systems").
86 See, e.g., Trial Testimony of James Barksdale at %8 (Nos. 98-1232; 98-1233),
Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d 59; Microsoft Trial Transcript at 30-31, 1999 WL 11491
(Nos. 98-1232; 98-1233) (Jan. 12, 1999, A.M. Session), Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d 59
(containing the testimony of Professor Fisher); Microsoft Trial Transcript at 25
(Nos. 98-1232; 98-1233) (June 2, 1999, A.M. Session) (containing the testimony of
Professor Fisher), Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d 59.
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consumers in 1995.87
Microsoft's interactions with Netscape, IBM, Intel, Apple, and
RealNetworks all reveal Microsoft's business strategy of
directing its monopoly power toward inducing other companies
to abandon projects that threaten Microsoft and toward
punishing those companies that resist.88
Microsoft threatened to terminate the Windows license of any
OEM that removed Microsoft's chosen icons and program
entries from the Windows desktop or the "Start" menu. It
threatened similar punishment for OEMs who added programs
that promoted third-party software to the Windows "boot"
sequence. These inhibitions soured Microsofts relations with
OEMs and stymied innovation that might have made Windows
PC systems more satisfying to users. 89
Not only did Microsoft prevent Navigator from undermining the
applications barrier to entry, it inflicted considerable harm on
Netscape's business in the process. By ensuring that the firms
comprising the channels that lead most efficiently to browser
usage distributed and promoted Internet Explorer to the virtual
exclusion of Navigator, Microsoft relegated Netscape to more
costly and less effective methods of distributing and promoting
its browsing software.
After Microsoft started licensing
Internet Explorer at no charge, not only to OEMs and
consumers, but also to IAPs, ISVs, IPs,
and even Apple,
Netscape was forced to follow suit. Despite the fact that it did
not charge for Internet Explorer, Microsoft could still defray the
massive costs it was undertaking to maximize usage share with
the vast profits earned licensing Windows. Because Netscape
did not have that luxury, it could ill afford the dramatic drop in
revenues from Navigator, much less to pay for the inefficient
modes of distribution to which Microsoft had consigned it. The
financial constraints also deterred Netscape from undertaking
technical innovations that it might otherwise have
implemented in Navigator. 90
Had Microsoft not been committed to protecting and enhancing
the applications barrier to entry, it might still have developed a
high-performance JVM and enabled Java developers to call

87 Microsoft,. 97 F. Supp. 2d at 81.
88 Id. at 105.
89 Id. 157-58.

90 Id. at 302-03.
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upon Windows APIs.
Absent this commitment, though,
Microsoft would not have taken efforts to maximize the
difficulty of porting Java applications written to its
implementation and to drastically limit the ability of developers
to write Java applications that would run in both Microsoft's
version of the Windows runtine environment and versions
complying with Sun's standards. Nor would Microsoft have
endeavored to limit Navigator's usage share ....
It is not clear
whether, absent Microsoft's interference, Sun's Java efforts
would by now have facilitated porting between Windows and
other platforms enough to weaken the applications barrier to
entry. What is clear, however, is that Microsoft has succeeded
in greatly impeding Java's progress to that end with a series of
actions whose sole purpose and effect were to do precisely that.
[Bly pressuring Intel to drop the development of platform-level
NSP software, and otherwise to cut back on its software
development efforts, Microsoft deprived consumers of software
innovation that they very well may have found valuable, had
the innovation been allowed to reach the marketplace. None of
these actions had pro-competitive justifications. 91
Most harmful of all is the message that Microsoft's actions have
conveyed to every enterprise with the potential to innovate in
the computer industry. Through its conduct toward Netscape,
IBM, Compaq, Intel, and others, Microsoft has demonstrated
that it will use its prodigious market power and immense
profits to harm any firm that insists on pursuing initiatives
that could intensify competition against one of Microsoft's core
products. Microsoft's past success in hurting such companies
and stifling innovation deters investment in technologies and
businesses that exhibit the potential to threaten Microsoft. The
ultimate result is that some innovations that would truly
benefit consumers never occur for the sole reason that they do
not coincide with Microsoft's self-interest. 92

91 Id. at 329.
92 Id. at 330-31.

